Abstract: This paper examines if the type of exchange rate used or size of the movement in the exchange rate matters in estimating exchange-rate exposure of U.S. nonfinancial multinationals. We find that switching from a broad trade-weighted exchange rate to a 2-digit SIC industry exchange rate increases the number of significantly exposed firms in a simple Jorion (1990) regression by 60 percent. Then separating crisis from non-crisis months we find additional evidence of exposure. Although the value of exposure does not change with the size of the exchange rate movement, we find some firms have significant exposure only in crisis periods while others have significant exposure only during normal fluctuations in exchange rates. All told, we find about 1 in 4 firms' returns is significantly affected by movement in the exchange rate between 1995 and 1999.
Introduction
Estimating exchange-rate exposure began with the simple Jorion model in 1990 and evolved to more sophisticated time-varying models early this decade (e.g., or Bodnar, Dumas and Marston( 2002) ). In all of these studies, although the question was how does movement in the exchange rate affect the firm's return, no one stepped back and examined whether the type of exchange rate used in the analysis mattered or if the size of the movement in the exchange rate mattered. Here we answer these two questions, focusing on monthly U.S. manufacturing multinational (MNE) data between 1995 and 1999.
We begin by examining the exchange rate measure. Past studies of U.S. firms used a broad U.S. trade-weighted exchange rate. This exchange rate captures the trade flows of the United States, as a whole, but does not necessarily reflect the foreign currency exposure of any given firm. Here we replace the broad U.S. dollar with 2-digit SIC industry exchange rates.
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Utilizing 2-digit trade shares from Goldberg (2001) , we construct monthly 2-digit SIC industry trade-weighted exchange rates. Using these exchange rates in the simple Jorion (1990) model, where the broad U.S. dollar found only 10 percent of the firms with significant exposure, we find the number of U.S. MNEs' with significant exposure rises to 17 percent.
Next we turn to the issue of whether the size of the movement in the exchange rate matters in the estimate of exposure. There are many reasons why exposure can differ between periods of normal exchange rate fluctuations and crises periods. During an exchange-rate crisis, for example, hedging opportunities might be limited and/or the firm may see a sudden change in revenue and/or costs, all of which affect the value of exposure. 2 We test for the possibility that exposure varies with the evolution of a crisis: there is a 'normal' value of exposure associated with 'normal' movements in the exchange rate, and a different value of exposure during periods of stress in the exchange rate market.
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Using crisis dates from the early warning system literature (e.g., Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998)) we construct 2-digit SIC trade-weighted crisis dummies. Incorporating these crisis dates into the exposure model we find that 14 percent of the firms have significant exposure during periods of normal movement in the exchange rate and 10 percent of the firms have significant exposure during crisis periods. Some firms' returns may have significant exposure in one states, but not both. Overall, 23 percent of the firms are affected by exchange rate movement in at least one of the two states.
We find that the value of exposure does not differ across states of exchange rate fluctuations. 4 On average, across all firms, the median estimate of exposure is -0. Comparing across crisis and non-crisis periods, many firms that had significant exposure in crisis periods did not have significant exposure in non-crisis months, suggesting that these firms might have been able to hedge small movement in exchange rates, but could not insulate their cashflow from crisis episodes. This result is consistent with Chow, Lee and Solt (1997) who argue changes in the exchange rate affect short-term and long-term cashflows, but current exchange-rate changes can be hedged or the cashflow effects are offset by interest-rate effects.
Since the firms that have significant exposure only in crises, which are periods hedges may not be available, Chow's comments hold. However, we also find just as many firms that have significant exposure during periods of normal movement in the exchange rate and not in crisis We perform sensitivity analysis on the results, using alternative crises indicators and MNE-specific weighting schemes. Whether we change the weighing scheme or early warning system crisis measure our results still hold: we find a large increase in the number of firms with significant exposure when we switch to a more firm-specific exchange rate, and the number of firms with significant exposure increases when we account for different sizes of exchange rate movement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the model. Section 2 overviews the data, while section 3 presents the exposure estimates. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
I. Model
We estimate a modified Jorion (1990) and I is the crisis indicator that is nonzero in a month where there is a crisis.
The structural adjustment to the Jorion model is the inclusion of the I term. In Jorion's framework exposure is β can find more firms with significant exposure by accounting for these features of the data, so we keep in mind that our results may be a lower bound for the actual number of firms' returns significantly affected by exposure when accounting for the effect of a crisis.
II. Data
In our analysis we estimate monthly time-varying exchange rate exposure for 164 U.S.
manufacturing multinationals in exchange rate crisis and non-crisis months between 1995 and 1999. First we discuss the specifics of the data sources and how we constructed key variables for the analysis. Then we provide some summary statistics.
II.A Data construction and sources
The data for this project mixes the standard return variables with new exchange rate data. Goldberg (2001) , the monthly 2-digit SIC industry exchange rate for industry i is defined as:
where N is the total number of countries that this industry trades with, w i,j is the percent of trade between the U.S. and country j in industry i, and ER j is the bilateral exchange rate between the U.S. dollar and the currency of country j. All firms within a given 2-digit classification will have the same exchange rate.
6 Although this exchange rate measure is not firm specific, it does more accurately reflect the currencies that are important to the firm's industry than the broad dollar measure. Across all firms in our sample, the correlation between movement in the 2-digit exchange rate series and the JPMorgan Broad is 0.73. The correlation varied from 0.37 for SIC 29 (petroleum and coal products) to 0.98 for SIC 38 (instruments). 7 The three indicators differ in the variables they use to identify periods of greater than normal exchange-rate pressure. Kaminsky et al. define a crisis by large movement in the nominal exchange rate and/or international reserves.
Crisis indicators: Associated with the early warning system literature, various measure of exchange rate dating have emerged. Our primary measure is Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (KLR) (1998), however, we also do sensitivity analysis with Frankel and Rose (1996) and Kamin, Schindler and Samuel (2001) . Each of the three studies creates monthly country indicators that take on values of zero or one.
7 A zero means that there is no exchange-rate crisis in the country at that date. A one indicates that, based on the authors' criteria, there was above normal exchange rate pressure (i.e., a crisis). Edison (2000) provides a good overview of the research on the early warning systems and, extends the indicators in the earlier studies through the 1990s.
We take the KLR country crisis indicators and create our 2-digit SIC industry's tradeweighted crisis dummy variable as follows:
where N is the total number of countries that this industry trades with, w i,j is the percent of trade between the U.S. and country j in industry i, and CRISIS j is the crisis indicator (KLR) of country j. I can take on a value between zero and one. If none (all) of the countries where this 2-digit SIC industry has trade flows had a crisis, then I is zero (one).
Since all of our 2-digit SIC industry crises measures are created from the same set of N countries, and no trade-weights are zero, all firms experience the same set of crises. Over our five-year sample period, all industries encountered 51 months without crises, and 9 months with crises. Of course, the value of I depends on the percent of trade in the crises countries. Across all industries and all months, the average value of I is 0.0024 (which reflects the fact that 51 months of our sample see I take on a value of zero). During crises months, the average value of the crises indicator is 0.016, indicating that about 1.6 percent of trade, on average, is with crises countries. Looking across industries in crises months, I ranges from an average value of 0.009 in industry 37 (transportation equipment) to 0.037 in industry 29 (petroleum and coal products).
II.B. Glance at the data
The exchange rates and crisis dummies we construct use the 2-digit SIC industry trade weights.
In an attempt to reveal how these variables are affected by the trade shares, consider SIC 26 -paper and allied products. This industry has 10 firms in our sample (of which we find 4 had significant exposure). We now turn to the estimated model.
IV. Exposure Estimates
To begin, we run the standard Jorion (1990) regression using the JPMorgan broad exchange rate and the appropriate SIC-specific exchange rate for each of the 164 firms over 1995:1-1999:12.
A summary of the exposure estimates is presented in Table 2 . Column 1 reports the results using the JPMorgan Broad exchange rate; we find the standard Jorion result that about 10 percent of the firms' returns are affected by exchange rate movement. The median exposure is -0.30, which translates to a one percent appreciation of the dollar causes monthly returns to fall, on average, by 0.03 percentage points. This estimate is in line with Jorioin's findings. Column 2 reports the results using the 2-digit SIC industry exchange rates. We find that the number of firms with significant exposure rises to 17 percent of the sample and the median exposure is -0.42. Hence, switching to the more firm-specific exchange rate causes the number of firms with significant exposure to rise, and remember this is a very simple model abstracting from trade shares, markups and pass-through, which when incorporated into past models generated a rise in significant exposure.
Next we move to estimating exposure in our model that accounts for exchange-rate crises, equation (1). Exposure is calculated as β Table 3 reports summary statistics on the values of β 1 in column (1) and β 2 in column 2 for all firms in the sample. As shown, 24 firms have significant exposure under normal fluctuations in the exchange rate. Sixteen firms had significant exposure during crisis months. Only 3 firms have significant exposure in both exchange-rate states, hence 37 firms have significant exposure in at least one of the two exchange-rate states, indicating 23 percent of the firms in our sample have significant exchangerate exposure.
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The little overlap in the number of firms that have significant exposure during normal periods of exchange rate fluctuation and crisis periods can be interpreted as follows. Firms with significant exposure during a crisis, but not in normal months, could be using exchange rate hedges in normal states but that these hedging opportunities are not available during crises. For those firms that see their returns affected by small exchange rate movements but not during crises, perhaps they are not hedging for cost/benefit reasons, but take the time to operationally hedge large fluctuations in the U.S. dollar.
Turning to the estimated value of exposure, column 3 reports summary statistics. The median value is -0.47, close to the median value when there are normal fluctuations in the exchange rate (because the value of I during crisis periods only averages 0.016 ). Note that the movement in the exchange rate is much larger in a crisis than a non-crisis period, so the effect of the exchange rate on returns is much more prominent during a crisis. That is, on average, the dollar appreciates 8 percent per month during the crisis months of our sample, so the median firm's return falls by 0.38 percentage points per month due to the movement in the exchange rate. This is slightly more than twice as large as the effect of the exchange rate movement on a firm's return in non-crisis months (because the dollar appreciated, on average, by 0.3 percent per month).
Looking at only those firms with significant exposure, reported in columns 4-6, the median value of exposure is three times as large as what is found over all firms in our sample.
Exposure jumps to -1.39, suggesting larger declines in the significant firm's returns during crisis periods than the average firm in our sample. The median significant firm's return falls by 1.1 percentage points in a crisis month. Table 1 , column 2).
Looking across SICs, we find 13 of the 18 SIC industries have firms with significant exposure. Figure 4 shows the distribution of firms across industries, both total number of firms in the industry and the number of significantly exposed firms. As seen, SICs 25 (furniture and fixtures), 22 (textile mill products), 26 (paper and allied products), 35 (industrial machinery and equipment), 34 (fabricated metal products) and 30 (rubber and miscellaneous plastic products)
all have more than a third of their firms with significant exposure. This is in stark contrast with 9 Ihrig (2001) reports results using an MNE-specific exchange rate, where the weights are the number of U.S. MNE's subsidiaries located in a given country relative to the total number of subsidiaries of the MNE. The results are similar to what is reported here; however, since the subsidiary weighting seems inferior to the 2-digit SIC weighting these results are not reported here.
14 SIC 36 (electrical and electronic equipment) that has no firm with significant exposure, even though it has quite a few firms in our total sample.
Last we test the sensitivity of our analysis to different crisis indicators and MNE specificexchange rates.
9 Each sensitivity analysis suggests the results are robust. That is, the more firmspecific exchange rate used in estimating exposure, the more firms one finds with significant exposure. The value of exposure is not sensitive to the size of the fluctuation in the exchange rate, but some firms' returns are affected by normal fluctuations in the exchange rate, while others are affected by large movement in the exchange rate. The value of exposure does vary by firm and is three time as large for firms with significant exposure. Overall, approximately one in four U.S. MNEs has significant exchange-rate exposure.
IV. Conclusion
This paper took the standard Jorion (1990) model for estimating exposure and adapted it to incorporate two specific exchange-rate issues. First we introduced a more firm-specific exchange rate in the analysis. Second, we adjusted the model to allow exposure to differ between periods of normal exchange rate fluctuations and during crises. These two simple modifications suggest that exposure is much more prevalent than the Jorion (1990) estimates suggested.
Estimation results suggest that almost 1 out of every 4 U.S. nonfinancial MNEs had significant exchange rate exposure between 1995 and 1999. On average, exposure is estimated to be near -0.5 across all firms in our sample and almost three times as large for firms significantly affected by exchange rate movements. The estimate of exposure does not depend on the size of the exchange rate movement. But, the effect of the exchange rate movement on the firm's return, of course, does depends on the size of the movement. During crisis periods, the effect on returns was quite large. Significant firms saw their return fall by an average of 1.1 percentage points in a crisis month. 1 9 9 5 0 1 1 9 9 5 0 5 1 9 9 5 0 9 1 9 9 6 0 1 1 9 9 6 0 5 1 9 9 6 0 9 1 9 9 7 0 1 1 9 9 7 0 5 1 9 9 7 0 9 1 9 9 8 0 1 1 9 9 8 0 5 1 9 9 8 0 9 1 9 9 9 0 1 1 9 9 9 0 5 1 9 9 9 0 9
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